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Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) was first diagnosed in the United States on 
January 15, 2020, in the state of Washington. Shortly after that, on February 29, 2020, the first 
case of COVID-19 was reported in New York City. From January 2020 through July 2020, there 
were 223,107 cases of COVID-19 that led to 18,787 COVID-19 related deaths in New York City 
alone. During this time, many left New York City to avoid contracting the virus or to return 
home. This travel seeded much of the transmission within the United States. We aimed to 
identify any international transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 
(SARS-CoV-2) as well from New York City and quantify the number of lasting transmission 
events by combining traditional epidemiological methods with phylogenetic and genomic 
methods.  
 By subsampling more than 450,000 SARS-CoV-2 genomes publicly available up to 
2020-11-02, we estimated the number of times SARS-CoV-2 was introduced from New York 
City to various geographic regions, not including the United States. On average, there were 6.7 
different transmission events from New York City to other regions of the world between January 
and July of 2020. On average, Western Europe had the most introductions from New York City, 
followed by Northern Europe. These results were somewhat expected based on air-travel data 
where we saw that most travelers from New York City flew to the Caribbean, Northern Europe, 
and Western Europe. Overall, this study helps show that outbreaks within the United States, such 
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In December 2019, it was determined that SARS-CoV-2 was the cause of a pneumonia 
outbreak in Wuhan, China (Coronaviridae Study Group of the International Committee on 
Taxonomy of Viruses et al., 2020; Wu et al., 2020; Zhou et al., 2020; Fauver et al., 2020). As 
soon as January 13, 2020, travel-associated cases of COVID-19 were seen outside China (Fauver 
et al., 2020; WHO Situation Report-1, 2020; WHO Situation Report-63, 2020). Less than a week 
later, the first case of COVID-19 was diagnosed in the United States (CDC Travel Case, 2020). 
The virus has since spread across the globe to nearly every country (WHO Situation Report-63, 
2020). As a result, the United States started to ban travel from various countries and regions 
starting on January 31, 2020(Taylor, 2020). Roughly a month later, the first community-
transmitted case of COVID-19 was diagnosed in the United States despite these bans (Moon et 
al., 2020).  
Between January 21, 2020, and July 31, 2020, there have been 410,365 confirmed cases 
of COVID-19 and 27,600 COVID-19 related deaths in New York state. Of those confirmed cases 
and COVID-19 related deaths, 223,107 cases and 18,787 COVID-19 related deaths were 
reported from New York City alone (COVID Data Tracker, 2020). Many New Yorkers decided 
to leave the city as cases increased in the early wave of the pandemic. In early April, the daily 
incidence peaked in New York City at nearly 11,000 new cases a day (New York COVID Map, 
2020). The post office received over 81,000 mail forwarding requests from New York City 
residents in that same month. The majority of those requests were for outside the city (Paybarah, 
Bloch, & Reinhard, 2020). Later in the year, it became apparent that infected travelers from New 
York City travel helped seed outbreaks across the United States (Carey & Glanz, 2020).  
Despite this, local officials often don’t know where or how outbreaks start until they can 
retroactively analyze the outbreak. However, people often need a source of blame for the 
outbreak (Jaworsky & Oiaoan, 2020). Frequently, due to various reasons such as health policy 
and politics, local outbreaks are blamed on international travelers (Chinazzi et. al, 2020; Dickens 
et. al, 2020; DPH, 2020; Travelers, 2020; Jaworsky & Oiaoan, 2020). International travel is often 
listed as a potential source for a local outbreak or included in policies enacted to help slow the 
rate of new infections in hopes to protect “the well-being of America” (Liptak and Vazques, 
2020; DPH, 2020; Governor Cumo, 2020; Governor Lamont, 2020). With this analysis, we hope 
to shift the focus from solely what international travelers might bring to the US to what travelers 
from the US might bring with them.  By using phylogenetic methods to gain insight into one of 
the more significant outbreaks within the US, which helped seed numerous local outbreaks, we 
show that the New York City outbreak was also the origin of international spread of SARS-CoV-
2.  Therefore, showing that actions within the United States can lead to consequences elsewhere 




To investigate the transmission patterns of SARS-CoV-2 and possible transmission 
events from New York City internationally, we used phylogenetic analysis to model global 
spread. Due to the abundance of available SARS-CoV-2 genomes we decided that we needed 
subsampled genomes to ensure that only quality samples were included. Additionally, we 
subsampled to better infer reliable phylogenies on this data due to the large number of similar 
sequences and low number of mutations (Morel et al., 2020). To add further information to the 
claims that the phylogenetic analysis produced, we collected flight data from New York City that 
shows the number of passengers that flew from any of the airports in New York City (John F. 
Kennedy International Airport, LaGuardia Airport, and Newark International Airport). We then 
used the number of passengers who flew from New York City to their destination region to 
indicate where probable transmission events occurred.  
Mortality Rates, Incidence, and Flight Data 
Mortality rates were collected using the data publicly available on the Johns Hopkins 
Coronavirus Resource Center website (Mortality, 2020). We collected New York City and 
United States mortality rates from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), where 
they have separated total United States mortality and New York City's mortality rate to find 
individual mortality rates (United States, 2021). These rates were used to create a proportion of 
global mortality by country and multiplied by 1,350 to achieve the desired total genome amount 
from each country. The resulting number of genomes from each country were used in the 
phylogenetic analyses (all numbers rounding up to the nearest whole number). 
To understand the spread of COVID-19 within New York City between December 2019 
and July 2020, we collected daily COVID-19 incidence data from the CDC reflecting cases in 
New York City (United States, 2021). We also collected flight data from OAG Aviation 
Worldwide Limited and CDC to get an insight into where probably SARS-CoV-2 transmission 
events occurred. This data was aggregated and filtered to only include flights leaving New York 
City-based flights. It was then grouped by destination region. The region assignment was 
assigned using the region assignments described by the United Nations with the addition of the 
‘New York City’ and ‘USA’ regions (Standard, 2021). The addition of these two regions allowed 
us to find introductions on a region level, while still allowing for the source to solely be New 
York City. In addition, it also allowed us to ignore introductions from New York City to other 
areas within the United States and separate those introduction events from the North America 
region. This region grouped method was used for the flight data as well as both the Bayesian and 
maximum-likelihood phylogenies. For a complete list of the number of flight passengers from 




All publicly available complete SARS-CoV-2 genomes worldwide were based on data 
available from GISAID up to October 26, 2020. Since each country has different genome 
sequencing approaches and different infection rates, these genomes were then subsampled. All 
genomes used were filtered to be collected between December 1st, 2019, and July 31st, 2020, 
from a human host. Additionally, the genomes were then subsampled by country-level mortality 
rate, based on the mortality rate per 100,00 population for each country in the world and New 
York City. Using a subsampling scheme, we subsampled a proportion of the genomes from a 
country based on their mortality rate when compared to the global mortality rate. This process 
was repeated three different times, each with different genomes being selected, to solidify the 
number of introductions to each region. This allowed us to generate three different subsamples of 
about 1,350 genomes.  
Using an augur pipeline, we performed multiple sequence alignment using MAFFT 
(Hadfield et al., 2018; Katoh & Standley, 2013). Following this, we were able to mask the 5’ and 
3’ ends along with any problematic sites (Maio et al., 2013). Then we were able to construct a 
maximum likelihood (ML) tree using IQ-Tree (Minh et al., 2020). This used a general time 
reversible (GTR) nucleotide substitution model (Guindon & Gascuel, 2003; Yang 1994). 
Additionally, IQ-Tree was used to get 1,000 UFBoot replicates during the tree inference (Minh et 
al., 2020). TimeTree 0.8.0 was then used to reconstruct ancestral states and infer divergence 
times (Sagulenko et al., 2018). The resulting trees (one for each subsample) were rooted on a 
SARS-CoV-2 virus sequence hCov-19/Wuhan/WH01/2019 (EPI_ISL_406798). This provided 
an insight into what we might expect from a Bayesian phylogenetic state reconstruction. During 
the creation of the maximum likelihood trees, region-level metadata was assembled using 
country-level metadata. Depending on the country of origin, a region label was assigned to each 
genome in the subsample (see Supplementary Table 1).  
TempEst was then used to perform quality control measures. Using these trees as inputs 
for a root-to-tip analysis (Rambaut et al., 2016). We removed dozens of genomes (n=36,38,26) 
from each subsample to remove outliers with residuals above ± 0.00025 subs/site. These smaller 
datasets were then rerun through the pipeline.  
 Finally, we performed Bayesian inference of the ancestral states using BEAST v1.10 
(Suchard et al., 2018). We used the time-scaled maximum-likelihood trees as fixed topologies, 
sampling every 1,000 generations, through 100,000,000 MCMC iterations, using the BEAGLE 
library (v3.1.0) to accelerate the computation (Ayres et al., 2019). We choose this approach to 
obtain the Bayesian inferred ancestral states without having to wait for the time needed to 
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compute a full Bayesian solution. This led to convergence and thorough mixing, with all 
parameters obtaining an ESS greater than 200 when evaluated with Tracer 1.7 (Rambauet et al., 
2018). After discarding 20% of the sampled tree as burn-in, TreeAnnotator was used to get the 
final trees. These trees were identical to the TimeTree output but had BEAST inferred ancestral 
states. Then we combined the ML bootstrap support and Bayesian inference of ancestral states 
with the time-scaled maximum-likelihood trees. To identify any independent transmission events 
of SARS-CoV-2 from New York City, we found clades (UFBoot > 70; MRCA discrete state 
probability > 0.7) with at least three taxa (see Figure 1 D). These introductions were deemed 
lasting transmission (non-singleton) events, while clades with less than three taxa were 
considered to be singleton events (du Plessis et al., 2021). We did this as the assumption of a 
singleton as an independent introduction is questionable. This is particularly true when the 
sample is sparse or unrepresentative, and the proportion of sequencing is low (0.13% sequenced 
samples out of all cases) (du Plessis et al., 2021).   
Results  
SARS-CoV-2 was first detected in New York City on February 29th, 2020, with case 
numbers peaking in April of that year (Gonzalex-Reiche et al., 2020; United States, 2021). 
Studies have shown that SARS-CoV-2 was likely to have started circulating before February 
29th in New York City, before the many US and non-US issued travel bans took place 
(Silverman, 2020; Chubb, 2020; Travelers, 2021). Due to the wide gaps in surveillance, 
continued travel, and the outbreak of COVID-19 in New York City, we hypothesized that travel 
from New York City would lead to transmission events of SARS-CoV-2 outside the United 
States between February 19, 2020, and June 25, 2020 (see Supplementary Figure 1).  
To investigate whether SARS-CoV-2 was spread internationally from travel related to 
New York City, we used travel surveillance data to reveal where probable transmission events 
would have occurred (fig map/table airlines). Our data demonstrate that the majority of 
international travel from New York City between January 2020 and July 2020 indicates that the 
most probable regions for transmission to occur were the Caribbean, Northern Europe, and 
Western Europe (see Figure 3A). 
10 
  
Figure 1. Phylogenetic analysis results for transmission events from New York City 
internationally.  
A. A maximum likelihood phylogeny colored by region. B. This is the clade within the above 
phylogeny that highlights the transmission events from New York City. C.  Time-informed 
maximum likelihood phylogeny clades showing where transmission events from New York 
City can be found. D. Where the average number of transmission events were introduced. 
The size of the region is a proportion of total average introduction events.  
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However, based on the phylogenetic analysis, we found different results. Using the cutoff 
values of UFBoot > 70 and MRCA discrete state probability > 0.7 which were found to best 
emulate Bayesian inference, we estimate that there were only 6.67 transmission events from New 
York City, resulting in sustained transmission chains (Alpert et al., 2021). Additionally, there 
were two transmission events into Western Europe, one transmission event into Northern 
Europe, and no transmission events into the Caribbean, unlike what we expected based on travel 
data. Interestingly, based on available genomic data, our analyses have not detected any 
transmission events from New York City into Southeastern Asia, Southern Asia, Central Asia, 
Eastern Europe, Middle Africa, Eastern Africa, Southern Africa, North America, and the 
Caribbean (see Figure 2 A). Each subsample found varying transmission events by region except 
for transmission events into Northern Europe (see Figure 2 B-D). The largest range of captured 
transmission events between the subsamples was two. In addition to capturing the transmission 
events from New York City to various geographic regions, we were able to estimate that these 
events happened both before and after travel restrictions were imposed both by the United States 
and by other countries. For values captured by each subsample, see supplementary table 3.  
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When we looked into each geographic region, we found that, with the exception of the 
Caribbean, there was a slight positive correlation (0.528) between the number of available 
sequences and the number of passengers on flights from New York City to that region (see 
Figure 3 B). The Caribbean had the most flight passengers from New York City, but it also had 
the least amount of publicly available genomes (see Figures 3 A and 3 C). This limited the 
chances of detecting sustained transmissions from New York City to that region.  When we 
looked into the correlation between the average number of transmission events from New York 
City and the number of flight passengers, and only accounted for regions with more than one 
thousand genomes, we also found a positive correlation of 0.632 (see Figure 3 D). However, 
there were still regions that we didn’t capture any transmission events that still met this criterion.  
 
Figure 2. Locations of Transmission Events from New York City. 
A. A map and figure legend for where transmission events from New York City were 
captured. The arrow width is the number of average transmission events captured to that 
region. B-D. The transmission events captured in the various subsamples. E. Box plots 
that show the spread of the events captured between subsamples by geographic region.  
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Figure 3. Flight and sequence availability. 
A. The proportion of flight passengers that flew from New York City. Their end destination is 
considered the region to which they travelled. B. A scatterplot of the number of publicly available 
genomes by geographic region at the time of subsampling by the number of flight passengers. The 
total number of genomes here are show on a log scale. C. A bar graph that shows the relationship 
between the number of publicly available genomes by geographic location on a log scale. The 
numbers above each column represent the total number of available genomes at the time of 
subsampling in that region.  D. A scatterplot that shows the relationship between the average number 
of transmission events captured and the number of flight passengers by region. Only regions with one 




By shifting the focus from what international travelers might bring to the US and 
focusing on what US travelers might bring to other regions, we found evidence that transmission 
events of SARS-CoV-2 from New York City to geographic regions outside the United States 
occurred. During our study period of December 2019 through July 2020, New York City had 
varying amounts of restrictions. During the beginning of the study period, there were little to no 
COVID-19 related restrictions in New York City until early March, despite the area becoming a 
hot spot of transmission (Governor, 2020; New York State, 2021; NYC, 2020). During this 
period, many residents and tourists of the area were unknowingly transmitting the virus. Using 
flight passenger data, we estimated that New York City originating transmission events would 
most likely occur in the Caribbean, Northern Europe, and Western Europe. Our study provides 
that there were independent COVID-19 introductions from New York City to multiple 
geographic regions.  Moreover, we found that all transmission events captured, regardless of 
region, were non-singleton introductions. 
By only looking at one US city, we were able to see multiple transmission events, 
including numerous lasting transmission events, across the globe. These findings, therefore, 
highlight the need to view US travelers as a potential giver of SARS-CoV-2 to other regions. The 
US has been the recipient of virus transmission during this pandemic, but through our research 
we can see that it has also dealt its fair share of transmission.  
To ensure that we were capturing transmission events, despite subsampling the data, we 
created three different subsamples of genomic data and created phylogenetic models for each 
dataset. It was also compelling to see that each subsample performed very similarly. Each model 
began with about 1,350 genomes, and after quality control measures, each ended with roughly 
1,320 genomes. After constructing the phylogenetic trees, each subsample also captured lasting 
transmission events to the same regions. Additionally, the number of singleton introductions was 
roughly the same. Different subsamples help us highlight the variability of phylogenetic models 
while also ensuring that true transmission events were captured.  
To create our phylogenetic trees, we took a nontraditional approach. Instead of using 
purely Bayesian phylogenetic methods, such as a traditional BEAST analysis, we instead used a 
combination of methods and meshed them together. This allowed for various things to occur, 
such as quick results, the ability to set thresholds, and the potential to compare future traditional 
Bayesian results to this analysis to check validity.  By using BEAST only to determine ancestral 
state reconstruction instead of performing the complete analysis, we were able to produce results 
in days rather than weeks or months. In addition, by using a bootstrapped IQ tree with branch 
lengths determined by TreeTime, we could set cutoff thresholds. This allowed us to set 
thresholds that resemble previous traditional BEAST results without the wait. This meshed 
approach could be useful for near real-time genomic epidemiology to produce robust and 
meaningful results without the wait time associated with Bayesian phylogenetics.   
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Our study does have several limitations. First, the full extent of transmission events, both 
lasting and singleton, were likely not captured. It’s important to note that due to the variability 
among sequencing capacity, various regions and countries do not have the same ratio of publicly 
available genomes as other geographic regions. Therefore, due to dependence on genomes, we 
may not have captured all of the transmission events from New York City or all of the lasting 
transmission events. For example, most air passengers during the study period flew from New 
York City to the Caribbean. However, we didn’t find any transmission events occurring from 
New York City to that region. This is largely due to the lack of publicly available genomes from 
the Caribbean. While there are hundreds of thousands of publicly available SARS-CoV-2 
genomes, not all regions have the same amount of sequences available. This may have 
influenced the results of other regions as well. Additionally, our analysis does not account for 
behavior beyond air travel. In reality, individual behavior, local health policies, and local 
conditions play important roles in transmission patterns and could help explain why New York 
City originating transmission events were successful in various regions while others were not. 
Finally, by subsampling the genomes and by not being able to observe all infections, we may 
have also failed to capture transmission events. But the lack of available genomic data made the 
inclusion of more genomes from highly sequenced regions difficult. As more sequencing data 
becomes available, efforts to capture transmission events should be revisited.  
Notwithstanding these limitations, our analysis provides insights into the introduction, 
exportation, and establishment of SARS-CoV-2. This was made possible by linking travel data, 
epidemiological data, and genomic data together. Public health authorities should be operating 
with the assumption that the United States is playing a role in international transmission and 
establishment of SARS-CoV-2. Therefore, the use of genomic epidemiology and traditional 




By combining travel data with genomic epidemiology, we estimated transmission events 
from New York City to different world regions. All of these transmission events lead to non-
singleton transmission within the region. This debunks the notion that the United States was only 
a recipient of virus introduction and not the giver of virus transmission. By looking at the 
outbreak in New York City, we were able to see how the US helped further international 
outbreaks. However, it is critical to acknowledge that due to the limited amount of publicly 
available genomes from various geographic regions and the sample size of the analysis, the 
strength of the conclusion drawn was impacted. It is therefore essential that results from genomic 
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To ensure that we were capturing introductions from New York City to different geographic 
regions, we needed a way to ensure that each genome that belonged to a specific region was 
grouped within that region. As such, we used the standard country methodology given by the 
United Nations statistics division with the addition of the ‘USA’ and ‘New York City.’ These two 
additional regions were included for our analysis purposes to see where transmission events 
from New York City on a region level occurred and to make sure that transmission events 
captured from New York City to other locations within the United States were able to be 
differentiated from transmission events to other North American countries.  
 
 
Supplementary Table 1: Region allocations. Below shows each geographic region used in the analysis. 
Each row contains the region name and what countries or locations were grouped into that region. For this 
analysis, the United States and New York City were listed as individual regions outside North America. 
Countries with multiple spellings are denoted as country name (secondary country name).  
Region Countries Within the Region 
Oceania 
Australia, Christmas Island, Cocos, Heard Island and McDonald Islands, New 
Zealand, Norfolk Island, Melanesia, Fiji, New Caledonia, Papua New Guinea, 
Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Micronesia, Guam, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, 
Micronesia, Nauru, Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, Polynesia, American Samoa, 
Cook Islands, French Polynesia, Niue, Pitcairn Islands, Samoa, Tokelau, Tonga, 
Tuvalu, Wallis and Futuna 
Eastern Asia China, Hong Kong, Macau, Japan, Mongolia, North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan 
Southeastern Asia Brunei, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar(Burma), Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Vietnam 
Southern Asia Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Iran, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka 
Central Asia Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan 
Western Asia 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Cyprus, Georgia, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, State of Palestine, Syria, Turkey, United Arab 
Emirates, Yemen 
Northern Europe 
Åland Islands, Denmark, Estonia, Faroe Islands, Finland, Guernsey, Iceland, 
Ireland, Isle of Man, Jersey, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Sark, Svalbard and Jan 
Mayen, Sweden, United Kingdom 
Western Europe Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Switzerland 
Eastern Europe Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic (Czechia), Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Ukraine 
25 
Southern Europe 
Albania, Andorra, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Gibraltar, Greece, Italy, Malta, 
Montenegro, North Macedonia, Portugal, San Marino, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Holy 
See 
Northern Africa Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, Western Sahara 
Western Africa 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte dIvoire (Ivory Coast), Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Saint Helena, 
Ascension and Tristan da Cunha, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo 
Middle Africa Angola, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, São Tomé and Príncipe 
Eastern Africa 
Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Mayotte, Mozambique, Réunion, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South 
Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
Southern Africa Botswana, Eswatini (Swaziland), Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa 
South America 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Falkland Islands, French 
Guiana, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, 
Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela 
Central America Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama 
Caribbean 
Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Bonaire, Sint Eustatius 
and Saba, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cuba, Curaçao, Dominica, 
Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Haiti, Jamaica, Martinique, Montserrat, 
Puerto Rico, Saint Barthélemy, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Martin 
(French part), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sint Maarten (Dutch part), Trinidad 
and Tobago, Turks and Caicos Islands, United States Virgin Islands 
North America Bermuda, Canada, Greenland,  and Saint Pierre and Miquelon 
USA United States of America 





Supplementary Table 2: Flight data containing the number of flight passengers from New York City. 
Listed are the number of passengers flying from one of the New York City airports internationally. The 
number of flights is shown by month and separated by region of destination.  
Region January February March April May June July 
Oceania 18,177 12,539 7,291 282 380 446 1,586 
26 
Eastern Asia 124,386 78,801 54,191 9,808 11,586 11,781 21,799 
South Eastern Asia 50,130 29,469 15,749 1,041 535 2,339 3,301 
Southern Asia 73,043 57,603 35,340 2,092 1,296 2,129 7,234 
Central Asia 3,157 2,435 1,358 20 8 43 179 
Western Asia 73,979 61,964 44,121 4,795 3,986 9,558 15,220 
Northern Europe 168,356 159,366 62,589 8,829 6,326 7,082 19,851 
Western Europe 142,773 128,006 58,582 6,909 8,721 17,276 28,028 
Eastern Europe 34,236 25,800 16,628 3,849 1,518 3,065 7,937 
Southern Europe 117,185 94,962 43,464 2,865 908 7,494 16,247 
Northern Africa 14,914 12,390 8,322 131 95 340 7,103 
Western Africa 11,054 8,477 6,927 134 232 1,057 2,332 
Middle Africa 723 530 286 1 1 12 6 
Eastern Africa 13,403 11,680 5,946 311 177 683 1,468 
Southern Africa 8,565 6,472 4,584 22 1 93 208 
South America 113,540 102,576 61,460 2,700 1,690 4,185 11,881 
Central America 142,359 125,227 70,698 6,279 1,718 9,178 20,139 
North America* 109,705 
100,636 74,599 2,913 1,231 2,832 10,233 
Caribbean 372,642 333,469 136,756 14,025 11,839 17,455 179,675 






Supplementary Table 3: Transmission events captured in each subsample shown by region. Listed 
below are the number of transmission events captured in each subsample. Each row contains a different 
geographic region along with the number of transmission events in each subsample and their average.  
Region First Subsample 
Second 
Subsample Third Subsample Average 
Oceania 4 0 2 2 
27 
Eastern Asia 1 2 1 1.33 
South Eastern Asia 0 0 0 0 
Southern Asia 0 1 0 0.33 
Central Asia 1 1 1 1 
Western Asia 9 4 11 8 
Northern Europe 11 13 19 14.33 
Western Europe 24 18 20 20.67 
Eastern Europe 3 1 4 2.67 
Southern Europe 3 1 3 2.33 
Northern Africa 5 3 4 4 
Western Africa 0 1 0 0.33 
Middle Africa 0 0 0 0 
Eastern Africa 0 0 0 0 
Southern Africa 0 0 0 0 
South America 17 10 16 14.33 
Central America 8 6 9 7.67 
North America* 
8 14 15 12.33 
Caribbean 0 0 0 0 






Supplementary Figure 1. Flight passengers from New York City against the number of incident 
cases within New York City. Each line corresponds with a geographic region that was travelled to 
from New York City between January 2020 and the end of July 2020. The bar graph in the 
background is the number of incident cases within the city by epiweek in the same time period. It 
wasn’t until March that New York city was officially reporting cases of COVID-19. Cases peaked in 
the end of March and the beginning of April during this study period.  
